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Lucretius’ symmetry argument is always understood as a simple addition to 
Epicurus’ deprivation argument. Both are based on same presuppositions and both are 
referring to the state of being dead. However, by closer examination, we can see that they 
are using different perspectives. The symmetry argument adopts a first-person 
perspective, whereas the deprivation argument adopts a third-person perspective. 
According to this difference, it can be further inferred that the symmetry argument 
actually provides a very important supplemental argument for the deprivation argument 
by trying to bridge the potential gap in the deprivation argument.  
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Defending Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument against the Fear of Death 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
In his Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus claims that death is nothing to us by providing 
the deprivation argument, which says that “Death is nothing to us. For what has been 
dissolved has no sense-experience, and what has no sense-experience is nothing to us.”1 
So the deprivation argument is mainly based on the idea that death cannot deprive us of 
anything since it is the privation of sense-experience. To support this claim, he proposes 
the existence argument which says that “when we exist, death is not yet present, and 
when death is present, then we do not exist. So death is nothing to us.”2 In other words, 
the existence argument points out that there is no subject to be harmed when one is dead. 
These two arguments constitute Epicurus’ main reasons against the fear of death. Later, 
his follower Lucretius provides a further argument—the symmetry argument—to argue 
against the fear of death. The basic idea of the symmetry argument is that post-mortem 
non-existence is not fearful because it is relevantly similar to pre-natal non-existence, 
and pre-natal non-existence is not fearful. There are many critics of these arguments. My 
thesis will focus on the analysis of Lucretius’ symmetry argument and its role in 
supporting Epicurus’ deprivation argument. My conclusion is that the symmetry 
argument provides a supplemental argument for Epicurus’ deprivation argument. 
                                                        
1 KD 2. Also, the basic idea of the deprivation argument can be found in Epicurus’ claim that “for all good and bad 
consists in sense-experience, and death is the privation of sense-experience.” See Ep. Men. 124. All translations of 
Epicurus are from Inwood and Gerson (1994).  
2 Ep. Men. 124.  
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Furthermore, the main objections to the symmetry argument are not convincing because 
they can be rebutted by appealing to Epicurus’ and Lucretius’ arguments.  
Chapter 2 Different Types of Harm of Death and Fear of Death 
  Epicurus’ ethics is based on his metaphysics, and his metaphysics is materialistic. For 
instance, according to Epicurus and Lucretius, the only things that exist per se are atoms 
and void. Both body and soul are made up of atoms, and the soul is a material organ 
within the body which is responsible for mental functions.3 What is more, when death is 
coming, the atoms that make up the body and the soul disassemble. 4  Hence, when 
Epicureans are asked “what is death”, their only answer is “death is annihilation”.5 In 
other words, death is nothing because there is no existence at all and a subject is 
necessary for something to be harmed. 
Before any specific analysis of the argument against fear of death, it would be helpful 
to examine various meanings of the phrase ‘harm of death’, its difference from the phrase 
‘fear of death’ and Epicurus’ possible answers against them. This doesn’t provide 
Epicurus’ full argument, but just an introduction to his view on death.  
Although there are many interpretations of “harm of death”, it is still possible to 
classify them into several categories. The first interpretation is the harm that one will die. 
By saying that after death the soul will dissolve and there will be no self at all at that time, 
one might think it is harmful because we are mortal and mortality deprives the meaning 
                                                        
3 See DRN 3 161-176. All translations of Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things are from Martin F. Smith (2001).  
4 See DRN 3 425-444.  
5 All of the subsequent argument will proceed on the assumption that Epicurus is right that death leads to the 
decomposition of the body and the soul and an existing subject is needed for harm. 
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of life. When we know that human beings are mortal, some people may assume that 
whatever they do, they will finally arrive at the same result—death; hence, life loses its 
meaning in the sense that different living processes ultimately lead to the same result. 
However, we can also say that it is the mortality that gives life meaning. Just because 
human beings are mortal, we should cherish our life and long for accomplishing 
something. The Epicureans hold the view that once we acknowledge the correct beliefs 
and attitudes about life’s mortality, this sort of harm and fear can be removed from our 
life. As Epicurus says: 
Hence, a correct knowledge of the fact that death is nothing to us 
makes the mortality of life a matter of contentment, not by adding a 
limitless time to life but by removing the longing for immortality.6
The second interpretation is the harm of the process of dying. Some people believe 
that there is no afterlife at all but still fear death because it will be painful during the 
process of dying. Under most circumstances, people depart because of age, accident, or 
disease. People assume that these ways of dying are often painful. Epicureans admit that 
there may be pain during the process of dying; however, they think when it is present, the 
wise man can still mitigate this sort of pain by learning the correct knowledge about 
death and recalling the happiness of life. Epicurus himself is such a wise man. He 
peacefully passed away after having suffered for a long time, firm to his own teachings 
about tolerating pain.7
The third interpretation is the harm of being dead, which refers to the status after death. 
                                                        
6 Ep. Men. 124. 
7 See D.L. 10.15-16.  
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According to Epicurus, a necessary condition on being harmed is that there must be a 
subject to endure it. When one is dead, the soul and the body have divided and their 
atoms separated. Hence, death has no subject because there is no “me” who still exists to 
suffer any harm. The existence condition is not satisfied after death. Therefore, if death is 
annihilation, then it is not reasonable to believe that there will be harm of being dead. 
And we’ll see later that Lucretius’ symmetry argument actually is concerned with this 
category of harm.  
Corresponding to these three interpretations of the harm of death, there are three fears 
of death—fear that one’s life is mortal, fear of the process of dying and fear of being 
dead.8  Obviously, harm of death and fear of death are different concepts with deep 
connections. For instance, it may be reasonable to say that death is not a harm after the 
person dies since there is no subject at that time; however, one might still fear death even 
if he admits that death is not a harm after he dies. Or, although it is hard to negate the 
harm of death during the process of dying, this harm does not necessarily lead to the fear 
of the process of dying. If we are told that after death we can go to another world which 
is more beautiful and comfortable, then we might even anticipate the process of dying 
even if we know it is painful, rather than fear it.  
The difference between the harm of death and fear of death relies on their different 
essences. Strictly speaking, whether something is harmful or not refers to facts. As a 
                                                        
8 In his book Facing Death, James Warren classifies fear of death into four categories. Other than these three fears, he 
adds the fear of premature death. p. 4.  
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result, if one accepts the belief that death is annihilation, the belief that there will be any 
harm after death will seem ridiculous. At least, if one believes that there will be no 
subject after death, further belief in the harm after death would be self-contradictory.9 
Beliefs of fact can sometimes be changed by providing proofs concerning the matter of 
fact itself. On the other hand, whether something should be feared or not refers to our 
attitudes toward those facts. And attitudes involve emotional significance and value 
judgment within themselves. Hence, even if one believes that being dead won’t be 
harmful, she might still feel fearful about that status. Since fear is included in our 
psychology, appealing only to facts may not mitigate it. Rhetorical language and 
persuasion may be helpful to get rid of fear of death.10
Chapter 3 Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument  
  When interpreting his master’s argument against fear of death, Lucretius proposes a 
supplemental argument, which is called the symmetry argument. In the whole Epicurean 
system against fear of death, I think there are at least two levels. The first level focuses 
on the question “what does death lead to”, and the Epicurean answer relies on their 
physics and atomism. Either death leads to annihilation or a sort of afterlife and Epicurus 
thinks that death leads to the former. The soul is wrenched from the body, and those 
original atoms begin to recombine randomly. There is no ‘self’ anymore, which is called 
by Lucretius “deathless death”.11 The second level question is that if death is annihilation, 
                                                        
9 But one might still be incapable of eliminating the fear of death even if he knows that death should not be feared.  
10 I think that is why Lucretius’ argument is especially useful in assuaging the fear of death by his poetical style and 
emotional language.  
11 DRN 3 869. 
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is it good or bad? Epicurus replies that death is neither good nor bad; it is just 
annihilation and nothing. The symmetry argument tries to answer why death is not bad 
based on the symmetry between our pre-natal non-existence and post-mortem non-
existence. 
As far as I am concerned, there are two places in which Lucretius tries to provide the 
symmetry argument. When Lucretius intends to explain why death is nothing to us, he 
says: 
As in time past we felt no distress when the advancing Punic hosts 
were threatening Rome on every side, when the whole earth, rocked 
by the terrifying tumult of war, shudderingly quaked beneath the 
coasts of high heaven, while the entire human race was doubtful into 
whose possession the sovereignty of the land and the sea was 
destined to fall; so, when we are no more, when body and soul, upon 
whose union our being depends, are divorced, you may be sure that 
nothing at all will have the power to affect us or awaken sensation in 
us, who shall not then exist—not even if the earth be confounded 
with the sea, and the sea with the sky.12
By referring to the Punic wars, Lucretius tries to show us the fact that we did not fear 
ancient periods even if there were important affairs. The reason that we did not feel pain 
or distress at those historical affairs is that we did not exist at that time and had no 
sensation or experience. Similarly, even if the world will come to an end in the future, 
once we cease to exist, we will feel nothing and of course should not fear anything at all.  
To further illustrate this similarity, Lucretius then gives us a general argument—the 
Symmetry Argument. Lucretius says: 
Life is granted to no one for permanent ownership, to all on lease. 
Look back now and consider how the bygone ages of eternity that 
                                                        
12 DRN 3 831-842. 
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elapsed before our birth were nothing to us. Here, then, is a mirror in 
which nature shows us the time to come after our death. Do you see 
anything fearful in it? Do you perceive anything grim? Does it not 
appear more peaceful than the deepest sleep?13
  This passage, which receives more discussion than the previous passage, is always 
viewed as the basic text for the symmetry argument. We can simplify the symmetry 
argument into a formal argument:  
Premise 1: There is a symmetrical relationship between pre-natal non-existence and 
post-mortem non-existence.  
Premise 2: The period of pre-natal non-existence is nothing to us (during our life span) 
and should not be feared. 
Conclusion 1: The period of post-mortem non-existence is also nothing to us (during our 
life span) and should not be feared.  
Conclusion 2: Death is nothing to us (during our life span) and should not be feared 
since death leads to post-mortem non-existence. 
In the argument above, Lucretius makes a switchover between post-mortem non-
existence and death. So here in the symmetry argument, he is talking about death in the 
sense of the status of after death, or the status of being dead. Obviously, among the 
various kinds of fear of death, Lucretius’ symmetry argument focuses on the last one, that 
is, the fear of being dead. The status of being dead refers to the eternal time period after 
one’s death. And the symmetry argument basically depends on the analogy between this 
period and the period before one’s birth.  
                                                        
13 DRN 3 971-976.  
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  Also we can further change this argument into a modus ponens:  
Premise 1: If the period of pre-natal non-existence should not be feared, then the period 
of post-mortem non-existence should not be feared. (Based on the similarity between 
them) 
Premise 2: The period of pre-natal non-existence should not be feared. 
Conclusion: The period of post-mortem non-existence should not be feared.14
  This argument now is in a valid deductive form, although there is still a difference 
between Lucretius’ words and the first premise in the modus ponens above. The second 
premise is quite reasonable. It seems we really do not feel distress about our pre-natal 
period, although we still need to justify this attitude. So to prove its soundness, we have 
to focus on the truth value of the first premise at first. 
  Let us see how Lucretius proves the similarity between pre-natal non-existence and 
post-mortem non-existence. He implies this similarity with several potential premises. 
  First of all, both of these two time periods are limitless. Lucretius uses the term 
“eternity” to describe the period before our birth. And just like through a mirror, the 
period after our death is also eternal. The first passage above can be viewed as a sub-
argument for supporting this premise. Even during the ancient Punic wars, we did not 
feel pain or distress. Similarly, when it comes to the future period after our death, we will 
not have any feeling including fear. The only time period we reasonably care about 
                                                        
14 In some sense, past events might be fearful, but it is not right to say that we fear past bad events, at least not in the 
exactly same way that we fear future events. Sometimes our attitudes toward past bad events can be described as a 
feeling of distress. However, when it comes to the issue of past nonexistence and future nonexistence, since it is not 
about our experience any more, our attitudes toward them might be similar. I’ll discuss this point specifically later.  
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should be our life span.  
Secondly, in both of these two periods, we do not exist and can feel nothing. Therefore, 
both of these two time periods are not harmful to us. In the eternal period before our birth, 
we were not present and our sensation was not present. We can imagine that at that time, 
those atoms that were going to constitute our body and soul were actually the 
components of other bodies and hence, there was no self-consciousness. At the same time, 
in the everlasting time after our death, we will not exist and our sensation or 
consciousness will disappear. This disappearance will last forever as time passes by, even 
to the end of this world. As a result, since we did not and will not possess sensation 
during our pre-natal non-existence and post-mortem non-existence, we had or will have 
no experience, and these two periods cannot harm us in the least.  
Based on the first two claims above, thirdly, we should not feel distress or fear toward 
either the pre-natal non-existence or the post-mortem non-existence. There is a big gap 
here from the claim “something is not harmful” to the claim “something should not be 
feared”. Obviously, there is a further presupposition in Lucretius’ symmetry argument. 
That is, once something is not harmful, it should not be feared. And this gap from the 
claim that something is not harmful to the claim that something should not be feared is 
quite hard to bridge. As shown in the first chapter, whether something is harmful is about 
facts—whether the post-mortem non-existence is harmful to us based on the 
harmlessness of the pre-natal non-existence; whereas something should be feared 
concerns on our psychology or the emotional significance of facts—whether we should 
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fear the post-mortem non-existence based on the precondition that we do not fear our 
pre-natal non-existence. 
  In his book Facing Death: Epicurus and his Critics, James Warren differentiates two 
ways to interpret Lucretius’ symmetry argument. The first way is that since our pre-natal 
non-existence was nothing to us before we were born, our post-mortem non-existence 
will be nothing to us after our death based on the similarity between these two time 
periods. The second way is that since looking back from within a lifetime, our pre-natal 
non-existence is nothing to us in our life time; our post-mortem non-existence is nothing 
to us in our life time as well based on the same similarity.15  Apparently, these two 
interpretations are quite different. Their basic difference depends on our perspectives 
when considering the symmetry between those two periods.  
The first interpretation comes from a third-person perspective, or, an objective 
perspective. By saying that death was nothing to us before our birth, it is clear that we are 
talking about it from the point of view referring to the time period before our birth; 
meanwhile, when we say that death will be nothing to us after our death, it is from the 
point of view referring to the time period after our death.  
The second interpretation serves a different purpose. It comes from the first-person 
perspective, or, a subjective perspective. To say something is harmful or not harmful is 
one thing, whereas to say something should be thought to be harmful or not harmful is 
another thing. So when we are looking back to the period before our birth and looking 
                                                        
15 Warren (2004) 58-60.  
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forward to the period after our death and we consider whether these two time periods 
affect us during our lifetime, it is a matter of our mental trouble or emotion.  
I agree with James Warren that the first interpretation is compatible with Epicurus’ 
argument against death. In the existence argument, when Epicurus says that when death 
is present, we do not exist, he intends to prove that death will not harm us during the 
post-mortem non-existence (because there will be no sensation and no experience). A 
similar perspective is used in the deprivation argument. The deprivation argument can be 
simply put in this way: 
Premise 1: What has been dissolved has no sense-experience. 
Premise 2: What has no sense-experience is nothing to us. 
Conclusion: Death is nothing to us. 
  However, it is still dubious whether this sort of argument can really mitigate our fear of 
death, or, more specifically, fear of the status of being dead. The reasons Epicurus 
provides here can be interpreted as there will be no sense-experience after death and 
hence, it will not harm us. No sense-experience and no harm here require a third-person 
perspective which refers to a future status. The deprivation argument would be more 
consistent if we change it into something like “there will be no sense-experience after 
death and there will be no harm after death. Hence, death will be nothing to us”. 
However, it seems that Epicurus intends to change our present attitudes toward death by 
providing the deprivation argument. Obviously, there is a gap here that weakens the 
deprivation argument. Even if we accept the view that death will lead to annihilation and 
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we will have no experience from then on, we can still ask for further justifications to 
remove our fear of that status during our lifetime. Surely Epicureans not only want to 
prove that death will be nothing to us, but also want to teach people that death should not 
be feared. Actually, in the letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus says that “he is a fool who says 
that he fears death not because it will be painful when present but because it is painful 
when it is still to come.”16 This important claim shows Epicurus’ effort to move from 
mere facts to the justification of our attitudes. It seems he wants to claim that it is 
irrational to fear something if it will not be painful when present. However, only adding 
this claim is not enough to alter our present attitudes toward death. To persuade people 
that death “is” nothing to us during our lifetime, Epicureans have to adopt the first-
person perspective argument. 
So the question is whether Lucretius’ symmetry argument adopts a first-person 
perspective or a third-person perspective. Or, we can say, whether Lucretius aims to 
provide a similar argument to further explain Epicurus’ deprivation argument or he 
actually proposes a supplemental argument to fill in blank left by Epicurus. I prefer to 
choose the latter answer as Lucretius’ purpose.17 There are two reasons supporting my 
preference. 
First of all, as we have already seen in those two passages above, Lucretius adopts 
different perspectives. In the first passage, Lucretius uses a similar ‘third’ person 
                                                        
16 Ep. Men, 124.  
17 In “Lucretius on Death and Anxiety”, Segal holds a similar view. As he says: “His (Lucretius’) argument is indirect 
and allusive, perhaps because he is aware that he is dealing with a subject generally avoided by the Master…Lucretius 
is not necessarily contradicting the teachings of Epicurus. Rather, he is supplementing them.” See Segal (1990) 26-27.  
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perspective as the deprivation argument when he is talking about whether the ancient 
wars were bad for us. So we can understand this passage as an additional premise to 
support Epicurus’ argument. However, it has the same problem as the deprivation 
argument, that is, even if something was not bad for us, why fearing it now is irrational? 
On the other hand, in the second passage, Lucretius uses the term “look back” to start his 
symmetry argument. That means he wants his reader to consider the pre-natal non-
existence period from the present time, or, he is asking us to consider our present 
attitudes towards those past time. Also, when we talk about the post-mortem non-
existence period, we should look forward to consider it from the present time.   
More importantly, right before Lucretius deals with the claim “death is nothing to us” 
there is a passage which in my opinion reveals the purpose of the symmetry argument. 
Lucretius spends almost one third of the book three of his DRN to explain why death is 
nothing to us. However, when we are speculating on his aim in giving the symmetry 
argument, we should go back to the paragraph right before line 830: 
Besides sharing the diseases of the body, the soul is often visited by 
feelings that torment it about the future, fret it with fear, and vex it 
with anxious cares, while consciousness of past misdeeds afflicts it 
with remorse. Remember also madness and loss of memory—
afflictions peculiar to the mind; remember the back waves of coma 
into which it sinks.18
If by any chance Lucretius is a poet or philosopher with consistency, then it seems to 
me that next in text, he should deal with how to resolve these sorts of mental troubles, 
how to mitigate the feelings of fear and anxiety in our soul.  
                                                        
18 DRN 3 824-826. 
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  Therefore, I think that Lucretius’ symmetry argument mainly tries to persuade people 
not to feel fear to death from a subjective point of view. As a result, the symmetry 
argument should not be viewed as having the same function as Epicurus’ deprivation 
argument; rather, it should be viewed as a supplemental argument to fill in a gap that was 
not resolved by Epicurus. The role of the symmetry argument in the Epicurean theory of 
death is that it provides a very important support for Epicurus’ argument against the fear 
of death. Once we understand the symmetry argument in an appropriate way, we will be 
able to further understand what Epicurus means by saying the “death is nothing to us”. 
After clarifying Lucretius’ intention, let us see whether his effort succeeds or not. Or, 
whether the symmetry argument really bridges the gap in Epicurus’ argument? It will be 
easier to answer this question after analyzing possible objections to the symmetry 
argument and Lucretius’ replies.19  
  There are many objections to Lucretius’ symmetry argument. In general, there are two 
main kinds of objections. One focuses on the symmetry between the pre-natal non-
existence period and post-mortem non-existence period. The other explores our 
psychology, including fear and anxiety and insists that even if we are persuaded that 
death is nothing to us, it cannot guarantee that we do not fear it. Thomas Nagel advances 
the first kind of objection, and Derek Parfit advances the second kind of objection.  
                                                        
19 Warren thinks that both Epicurus and Lucretius fail despite invoking our present attitudes toward death. However, 
according to my analysis above, Lucretius’ symmetry argument intends to invoke such an attitude by adopting a first-
person perspective and later we’ll see this way is successful as well.  
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Chapter 4 Nagel’s Objection to the Symmetry Argument and Lucretius’ Possible 
Response 
Of the two main premises of the symmetry argument, Nagel focuses on the one that 
says pre-natal non-existence is symmetrical to post-mortem non-existence. He proposes 
two objections to this premise, and these two objections are associated with each other. 
One is that pre-natal non-existence doesn’t deprive good from life whereas post-mortem 
non-existence does. The other says that it is possible for people to die later but 
impossible to be born earlier or later. The second one is a sub-argument for the first one. 
And we can generally call Nagel’s objection “the deprivation approach”. Nevertheless, I 
find that both of the objections are not convincing since they rely on misinterpretations 
of Lucretius’ argument. More specifically, Nagel needs to clarify his concept of personal 
identity in order to argue against the symmetry argument.  
Nagel answers the question whether it is a bad thing to die in “Death”.20 His argument 
presupposes that death is the permanent end of life. So Nagel actually talks about death 
based on the same assumption as Epicurus, that death is annihilation, and there is no 
conscious existence during the state of being dead. Also, Nagel mainly talks about death 
in the sense of the state of being dead, rather than the process of dying or premature 
death. His main conclusion is that we do not object to death merely because it involves 
long-term non-existence; rather, death is bad because it deprives us of the good of life. To 
                                                        
20 Nagel, Thomas. 1972. “Death”, in Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1-10. 
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support this conclusion, he provides three reasons. 21
   First of all, there is a relation between what is good about life and what is bad about 
death. According to Nagel, what is good about life depends on our experience and history. 
As Nagel claims: 
There are elements which, if added to one’s experience, make life 
better; there are other elements which, if added to one’s experience, 
make life worse. But what remains when these are set aside is not 
merely neutral: it is emphatically positive. Therefore life is worth 
living even when the bad elements of experience are plentiful, and 
the good ones too meager to outweigh the bad ones on their own. The 
additional positive weight is supplied by experience itself, rather than 
any of its contents.22
Nevertheless, what is bad about death does not refer to the experience of being dead 
or the state of being dead since there will be no subject to experience at all. Rather, this 
evil comes from its deprivation of the good of life. One presumption is that there is the 
good of life. The good of life does not depend on particular benefits or evils. Life is 
worthy even if there are many misfortunes. Being alive is emphatically positive and this 
positive property is supplied by experience itself. As Lucretius mentions: 
‘Never again,’ mourners says, ‘will your household receive you with 
joy; never again will the best of wives welcome your home; never 
again will your dear children race for the prize of your first kisses and 
touch your heart with pleasure too profound for words…23
  Furthermore, as Nagel says, “most of us would not regard the temporary suspension of 
life, even for substantial intervals, as in itself a misfortune.”24 To illustrate this claim, he 
provides a discontinuous existence case. Imagine that one day we can separate our life 
                                                        
21 Nagel (1972) 3-4. 
22 Nagel (1972) 2. 
23 DRN 3 894-897.  
24 Nagel (1972) 3.  
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span into several phases, with long periods of suspended animation in between; without 
the consideration of desiring to be with friends and family members, many people might 
choose or at least would not fear to separate their life time into several phases. Here, the 
term “in itself” is quite important. Admittedly, such a discontinuous existence may be 
disadvantageous due to the disconnection of one’s social relationships and cultural 
background. However, it can be viewed as advantageous in itself simply because life 
continues, even if this life continues after the periods of non-existence. 25  So the 
temporary suspension of life is not always considered as a tragedy in itself.  
  Then, Nagel argues for the asymmetry or the difference between pre-natal and 
posthumous non-existence: 
The time after his death is time of which his death deprives him. It is 
time in which, had he not died then, he would be alive. Therefore any 
death entails the loss of some life that its victim would have led had 
he not died at that or any earlier point.26
  According to Nagel, the post-mortem non-existence time is bad not because it is 
everlasting; rather, its badness rests on its deprivation of the good of life. This claim 
presupposes three assumptions: death is the permanent end of life, life is in itself good, 
and the prolonged life can provide more goods of life. Among these three assumptions, 
the first two are consistent with Epicurus’ philosophy. It is the third assumption that is 
apparently contradictory to Epicureans’ philosophy since Epicurus thinks that pleasure is 
                                                        
25 As far as the importance of personal identity is concerned, many philosophers prefer to hold that personal identity 
requires psychological continuity; some of them also think that persons persist over time by being wholly present. 
However, these two requirements are not exactly same. Their difference are presented by some philosophers. See, for 
example, Michael C. Rea and David Silver, “Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity”; Trenton Merricks, 
“Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity”.  
26 Nagel (1972) 7-8. 
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limited and extending life cannot guarantee further pleasure.27
  Then, even if we accept that death can deprive us the good of life, how can we make 
sure that the pre-natal non-existence time period does not deprive us the good of life? As 
Fred Feldman says:  
One puzzle that must be confronted is this: if early death is bad for us 
because it deprives us of the goods we would have enjoyed if we had 
died later, then why isn’t late birth just as bad for us? After all, it 
seems to deprive us of the goods we would have enjoyed if we had 
been born earlier.28
If by living longer, we can get more benefits from being alive, then why we cannot 
obtain the same result by being born earlier? Although Nagel admits that both of the 
prenatal and postmortem non-existence periods are times when we do not exist, he 
maintains that the mirror metaphor is wrong. Nagel tries to explain this difference by 
saying that: 
But we cannot say that the time prior to a man’s birth is time in which 
he would have lived had he been born not then but earlier. For aside 
from the brief margin permitted by premature labor, he could not 
have been born earlier: anyone born substantially earlier than he was 
would have been someone else. Therefore, the time prior to his birth 
is not time in which his subsequent birth prevents him from living. 
His birth, when it occurs, does not entail the loss to him of any life 
whatever.29
  According to these relevant paragraphs above, we can put Nagel’s main (chain) 
argument against the symmetry argument as follows: 
Sub-premise: Anyone born earlier than he was would have been someone else. 
                                                        
27 KD 18-20.  
28 Feldman, Fred. 1991, “Some Puzzles about the Evil of Death”, the Philosophical Review, Vol. 100, No. 2, pp. 205-
207. 
29 Nagel (1972) 8. 
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Premise 1 (sub-conclusion): Being born at time t does not deprive one of goods one 
would have enjoyed if one had been born earlier than t; 
Premise 2: Dying at time t does deprive one of the goods one would have enjoyed if one 
had died after t. 
Conclusion 1: Pre-natal non-existence and posthumous non-existence are asymmetrical.  
Conclusion 2: We should have different attitudes toward pre-natal non-existence and 
posthumous non-existence.  
  For the sub-premise above, Nagel further explains that personal identity relies on the 
direction of time. As he says: 
Distinct possible lives of a single person can diverge from a common 
beginning, but they cannot converge to a common conclusion from 
diverse beginnings….Given an identifiable individual, countless 
possibilities for his continued existence are imaginable, and we can 
clearly conceive of what it would be for him to go on existing 
indefinitely.30
  After having a general sense of Nagel’s objection, we can do a comparison between 
Nagel and Lucretius on the symmetry argument. Basically, both of them assume that the 
period of time before we were born and the period of time after our death are limitless in 
time or long enough to have limitless possibilities; both of them assume that people do 
not tend to regard the pre-natal period of time as a misfortune. However, unlike Nagel 
who thinks that death deprives us the good of life, Lucretius maintains that death is 
neither good nor bad and does not deprive us anything at all.  
With Nagel’s objection, there are three possible responses that may be made by 
                                                        
30 Nagel (1972) 8.  
 20
Epicureans. The first one is based on the analogy between death and sleep. The second 
one comes from the claim that the good of life is limited. The last one is to use the 
existence argument itself to reply to Nagel’s argument. 
First of all, Epicureans always make the analogy between death and sleep. Since 
usually we assume that sleep in a natural way does not deprive us the good of life, we 
should not think that death would.31 As Lucretius says: 
At the moment when people jerk themselves out of sleep and gather 
themselves together, the primary elements of the spirit scattered 
throughout their limbs cannot be straying far from the motions that 
produce sensation. It follows that death should be considered to be of 
much less concern to us than sleep—that is, if anything can be less 
than what we perceive to be nothing.32
Clearly, people usually do not choose to minimize their sleeping time to increase the 
good of life. The state of being asleep is not anything bad for us, and the state of being 
dead is not either. Hence, as the deepest sleep, death should not be viewed as the 
deprivation of any good of life. Appealing to this reply, Nagel might answer that there is 
still a difference between sleep and death. For instance, before we sleep, we know that 
we will wake up later and continue to enjoy the good of life. It is just like the 
discontinuous existence case. Sometimes even sleeping itself is an instance of the good 
of life. On the other hand, before we die, if we assume that death leads to nonexistence 
forever, and we know that we can never enjoy the good of life; it is still reasonable for us 
to fear it or feel distress about it. However, this reply would conflict with Nagel’s own 
                                                        
31 Some people think that sleep actually deprives us the good of conscious life. If we were not supposed to sleep several 
hours each day, we would enjoy more goods of life. However, since sleep in a natural way is required for us to enjoy 
the good of life, I prefer not to view this necessary condition for human beings to stay healthy as the deprivation of the 
good of life. 
32 DRN 3 922-928.  
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argument since this reply assumes that death is a bad thing because death leads to an 
everlasting non-existence, which is inconsistent with Nagel’s previous assumption. 
Or, Nagel might say that people do not fear sleeping only in the sense that this sleeping 
is in a natural and healthy way, i.e., this sleeping does not deprive them of the good of 
life. If someone has a medical condition that makes him sleep 20 hours a day, while he 
lives the same amount of life time, he could think that this is bad because of the ‘life 
time’ it deprives him of. Likewise, if there is a new drug that can provide all benefits of 
sleep in a healthy way with much shorter sleeping time, people could think that this is a 
good thing because it prolongs our life time. Nevertheless, just as we admit that sleeping 
should not be feared if it is in a natural way, we have to admit that death should not be 
feared if it is in a natural way. If we accept the precondition that all human beings are 
mortal, then facing death which is necessary and natural should not be too difficult. And 
even if extending life can produce more pleasure, how long should this extension be? As 
James Warren says:  
Even those who would wish to accept that death can be a harm since 
it robs us of goods which we would otherwise have enjoyed (the 
counterfactual account of the harm of death) might shrink from the 
claim that death robs us goods located a thousand years in the 
future…A more moderate position will concede that death is only a 
harm in so far as it robs us of time and goods we could reasonably 
have been expected to experience.33
Even if the good of life can be multiplied and more is better than less, there must be a 
reasonable limitation. And this limitation is the natural condition of human beings. 
                                                        
33 Warren (2004) 71.  
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Suppose that based on the existing medical condition and natural environment, the 
average life expectancy of human beings is 70; then death at 70 or later should not be 
viewed as a bad thing since it does not deprive the subject any natural life span he is 
supposed to possess. In this sense, only the premature death can be viewed as a misery. 
Nevertheless, Lucretius’ symmetry argument does not argue for the conclusion that 
premature death should not be thought harmful. Again, the symmetry argument only 
focuses on the harm of the period after death.  
Secondly, whether the good of life can be multiplied is dubious. Nagel presupposes 
that we will enjoy more happiness with the extension of our life because we can possess 
more of the good of life. To the contrary, although Epicureans regard pleasure as the most 
important good of life, as the starting point and the ultimate goal in life, they do not think 
pleasure is limitless. In the Principal Doctrines, Epicurus says: 
Unlimited time and limited time contain equal amounts of pleasure, if 
one measures its limits by reasoning. 
The flesh took the limits of pleasure to be unlimited, and only an 
unlimited time would have provided it. But the intellect, reasoning 
out the goal and limit of the flesh and dissolving the fears of eternity, 
provided us with the perfect way of life and had no further need of 
unlimited time. 34
So the unlimited time cannot bring any further pleasure. It is not necessary to say that 
death can deprive us the good of life since all things are the same and no more pleasure 
can be found even if we can prolong our life. The justification for the limit of pleasure 
comes from Epicurus’ view on pleasure and pain. According to Epicurus, “the removal of 
                                                        
34 KD 19, 20. 
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all feelings is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever a pleasurable feeling is 
present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of 
distress.” 35  Hence, as Stephen Rosenbaum says in “Epicurus on pleasure and the 
complete life”: 
Taking the removal of all disease to be the limit of the magnitude of 
complete health, one can understand how a person’s complete health 
cannot be increased by occurring for a longer time. It is as great as it 
can be at all times a person has it. Analogously, if the absence of pain 
is katastematic pleasure, then Epicurus apparently thought that 
pleasure is an occurrent state such that either one is in the state or one 
is not. One either has reached the limit of pleasure or one has not. 
One either has pain or one does not. Therefore a life full of such 
pleasure will be like a life full of complete health. A total pleasant life 
could not be more pleasant, however long its extent.36  
    So living a long life is not a necessary condition for living a pleasant life. Also, 
Epicureans might say that the desire for the extension of life is not natural at all. So to 
guarantee the validity of his argument, Nagel has to provide further reasons for his third 
premise which says that the good of life can be multiplied and more is better than less.  
  Thirdly, Nagel’s objection fails to defeat Epicurus’ existence argument. We can still 
ask “If death deprives us anything, when and to whom is it a misfortune?” When alive, 
death is not present, so how death can deprive us the good of life? Meanwhile, when 
dead, we do not exist; so to whom does death deprive the good of life? Nagel himself 
addresses this objection. To answer how the evil of death can be assigned to a subject, 
Nagel maintains that “most good and ill fortune has as its subject a person identified by 
                                                        
35 KD 3.  
36 Rosenbaum, Stephen. “Epicurus on pleasure and the complete life”, Monist, Jan. 90, Vol. 73, Issue 1.  
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his history and his possibilities, rather than merely by his categorical state of the 
moment.”37 For instance, one would not feel bad if he does not know he is betrayed by 
his friends. However, betrayal is still evil; otherwise it is hard for us to explain why the 
discovery of betrayal is a misfortune. So the evil of something to a person is not always 
connected with his experiential state. However, this account does not provide sufficient 
reason to believe that death is evil even if there is no subject when being dead. On the 
one hand, in the betrayal case, although the person does not know the betrayal, there is 
always the possibility of him to be aware of the fact; however, in the death case, the 
possibility of awareness has been removed by the permanent non-existence. On the other 
hand, if death can deprive any subject the good of life, the same reason can be applied to 
the prenatal non-existence as well. To answer this, Nagel proposes his own concept of 
personhood.  
  Back to Nagel’s objection, it seems to me that Nagel actually implies that the time of a 
person’s birth is a necessary condition for him to be himself, that is, to constitute his 
personal identity. The issue of personal identity concerns various related problems. For 
instance, what is the necessary condition for some being to be a person; what guarantees 
one the unique person one is; what makes one’s identity persist over time; etc. The 
possible conditions that must be satisfied to be the same person involve the physical body, 
consciousness, psychological experiences and so on. The question is if Nagel assumes 
that the time of one’s birth is necessary for his personal identity, how could he deny that 
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 25
the time of one’s death is also necessary for his personal identity? Let us suppose John 
actually lived from the period 1930—1990. For Nagel, if John were born in 1920 and 
died in 1990, even if he had same psychology and experience, it was actually not John 
but someone else. However, if John were still born in 1930 but died in 2000, then this 
time he is still the same John with a longer life and more pleasure. The reason provided 
by Nagel is that time is determined to go from past to future and hence, the same 
beginning can lead to different possibilities whereas different beginnings can never come 
to the same ending point. However, one can still continue to ask that why different 
beginnings cannot guarantee personal identity or why the same beginning with different 
ending points can guarantee personal identity. Nagel needs to provide further reason to 
support his claim that a person born earlier than in fact he was would be a different 
person. 
  In the article “death and deprivation; or, why Lucretius’ symmetry argument fails”, 
Frederik Kaufman provides another definition for personal identity to argue against the 
symmetry argument based on the deprivation account. Kaufman disagrees with Nagel 
that time of birth is a necessary condition for personal identity. According to Kaufman, 
there are two ways to define personhood—bodily considerations and psychological 
considerations. It is the latter that determines personal identity, whereas the time of birth 
is connected with bodily consideration. So he thinks that birth is irrelevant to the issue at 
hand. As he proposes: 
       The features of personhood which most concern us are not captured by 
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genetic or bodily considerations or time or birth; hence, showing that 
a birth or a fertilization or a bodily constitution could have occurred 
earlier does not show that, in the relevant sense, the same person 
could have existed earlier. 
It is in virtue of psychological connectedness to the events of our 
lives that we construct a sense of ourselves as ourselves, and 
psychological continuity is what most concerns us when we 
deliberate about whether or not we could have lived at different 
times or different places; and the prospect of psychological 
extinction is surely what disturbs us when we think about death.38
  This view is compatible with Lucretius’ reasoning that the recollection of our atoms 
cannot compose the same person with the interruption of the consciousness. Lucretius 
says: 
Even supposing that the mind and the spirit retain their power of 
sensation after they have been wrenched from our body, it is nothing 
to us, whose being is dependent upon the conjunction and marriage 
of body and soul. Furthermore, if in course of time all our 
component atoms should be reassembled after our death and 
restored again to their present positions, so that the light of life was 
given to us a second time, even that eventuality would not affect us 
in the least, once there had been a break in the chain of 
consciousness.39
  Obviously, for Lucretius, his definition for personal identity involves at least two 
conditions—the combination of body and soul and the continuity of consciousness.  
However, Kaufman maintains that it is impossible for a person in the psychological 
sense to exist earlier but possible to exist longer. His reason is that to guarantee personal 
identity, psychological continuity must be satisfied. If in the psychological sense a person 
can exist earlier than he actually did, “a psychological continuum which, by hypothesis, 
starts earlier, would be a sufficiently different set of memories and experiences, and 
                                                        
38 Kaufman, Frederik. “Death and Deprivation; Or, Why Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument Fails.” Australian Journal of 
Philosophy Vol. 74, No. 2; June 1996. pp. 305-312.  
39 DRN 3, 845-852.  
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hence be a different psychological self.”40 However, when it comes to the issue of longer 
existence, Kaufman thinks the psychological continuity will not be disconnected. “In 
imaginatively extending a psychological continuum beyond the point at which it was in 
fact extinguished, we do not have to disrupt the previous contents of the continuum; we 
simply make additions to it.”41 According to Kaufman, it is psychological continuum that 
determines the continuity of personhood. And he insists that existing earlier would 
disrupt this continuum whereas existing later will not. However, Kaufman does not 
explicitly point out what determines ‘psychological continuum’. Is it the beginning of the 
psychology or some sort of continuity? If existing earlier can disrupt the psychological 
continuity, why cannot existing longer? Of course we can imagine different possibilities 
in one’s extending life than in fact it was, but what if there is an essential change in his 
psychology? For instance, John is supposed to die at 60, and he is well known for his 
kindness and generosity. Now imagine metaphysically his life can be extended to 70. In 
this additional 10 years, John suffers some disasters and becomes malicious and brutal. 
Can we maintain that this John in his extending life is the same person? At least, it is 
obvious that Kaufman’s claim that extending life in the psychological sense is simply 
making additions to it requires further justification.  
Let us see another way to argue against the symmetry argument. This kind of objection 
is represented by Derek Parfit, and it is based on the justification of our psychological 
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attitudes toward the past and the future. 
Chapter 5 Parfit’s Objection to the Symmetry Argument and Lucretius’ Possible 
Response 
  As already mentioned previously, harm of death and fear of death are two different 
affairs. The former refers to a factual state whereas the latter refers to our psychology. 
Hence, it might be rational to fear death even if we accept the thesis that death is not 
harmful to us both when alive and after death. However, if Epicurus and Lucretius are 
right, if the prenatal non-existence and the posthumous non-existence are symmetrical, 
Lucretius’ suggestion that we should adjust our attitudes toward death should be viewed 
as rational.42 Although it is still possible that psychologically we cannot remove our fear 
of death, but given the correctness of the symmetry argument, this fear loses its 
foundation, or using Kaufman’s words “if Epicurus and Lucretius are correct, we should 
treat the fear of death as a silly phobia—hard to deal with but lacking justification.”43
  In his book “Reasons and Persons”, Derek Parfit tries to justify our different attitudes 
toward the past and the future, and this justification is often used to prove the asymmetry 
between our pre-natal non-existence and our post-mortem non-existence. Parfit provides 
a case which he calls “my past and future operations”. In this case, there is a kind of 
operation which is set up to be painful and performed without the use of anesthetic. 
Further, because the suffering is too severe, the patients’ memories about this are 
                                                        
42 Among three periods of death—before death, the process of being dead and after death, both Epicurus and Lucretius 
admit that it is rational to fear the pain at the instant of death. In the Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus says that “he is a 
fool who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when present but because it is painful when it is still to 
come.” So it is still reasonable to fear death on the ground that there will be pain during the process of dying.  
43 Kaufman (1996) 306.  
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removed after the operation by some drug. Suppose there are two patients A and B. A 
wakes up in the hospital and finds out he has no memory about the last few hours. So he 
asks the nurse whether he has already had the operation. The nurse only knows that A is 
one of two patients but cannot tell which one has already finished the operation. Assume 
that A already suffered the operation for 10 hours, and B is going to undergo a shorter 
operation later. Parfit insists that person A would rather choose to be the guy who already 
suffered the operation even if he knows that this one was a much more horrible one.44 
According to this preference, Parfit concludes that between great pain in the past and 
light pain in the future, we prefer to choose that our pain is in the past even if it is greater.  
  So Parfit’s case mainly deals with the asymmetry between our attitudes toward the past 
and the future. The structure of this kind of objection is like this: since, psychologically, 
human beings have different attitudes toward the past and the future, it is rational to hold 
that there is asymmetrical relationship between the past and the future; hence, Lucretius’ 
symmetry argument is unsound because one of its premise holds that the pre-natal non-
existence time period is relevantly similar to the post-mortem non-existence time period.   
  However, this argument is also not strong enough to defeat the symmetry argument. 
Firstly, Parfit implies that most people prefer to choose misfortunes in their past rather 
than in their future. But this is not always the case. For instance, Rosenbaum thinks that 
the loss of one’s reputation can be viewed as a counterexample. Most people would 
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choose the loss of reputation in their future rather than in their past.45 The difference 
between Parfit’s case and Rosenbaum’s case is that surgery pain is temporary whereas 
the loss of reputation has a further effect that reaches into the future. So the relationship 
between our preference and our emotion are not as easy as Parfit proposes.  
Secondly, there is a difference between the past or future experience and past or future 
non-existence. The claim that we have different attitudes toward past and future suffering 
cannot be equated to the claim that we have different attitudes toward the pre-natal non-
existence and the post-mortem non-existence. In Parfit’s case, the patient’s different 
attitudes toward the past and the future refer to his experience. He must suffer the pain 
either in the past or in the future. In other words, the past and the future experiences are 
relevant to the benefit of the person at issue. On the other hand, Epicureans can reply that 
our pre-natal non-existence and post-mortem non-existence have no relevance to us. 
Assuming there was turbulence like the Punic wars or there will be disasters like the end 
of the world, since we were or will not exist at those times, they are nothing to us. 
Therefore, in Parfit’s case, the past and the future involve the existence of the patient; 
whereas in Lucretius’ symmetry argument, the past and the future do not involve the 
existence of the person. Specifically, this case should be devised to address the past and 
the future non-existence. In Rosenbaum’s words: 
One’s death (being dead), if a bad at all, is not the sort of bad of which a 
person could be aware, and our anxiety bias toward the future is only for 
experienced bads, like pain, injury, and other things of which we can 
                                                        
45 Rosenbaum, Stephen. 1989. “The Symmetry Argument: Lucretius Against the Fear of Death”, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 50, No. 2. pp. 353-373.  
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become aware, such as future pain. Therefore, our bias toward the future 
is not general enough to include such alleged bads as being dead. 46
  Even if we accept that there is a logical connection between our attitudes toward the 
near past and the near future and our attitudes toward the pre-natal non-existence and the 
post-mortem non-existence, Parfit’s objection is still dubious. There is also a difference 
between our attitudes and the justification of those attitudes. As James Warren argues: 
Although they may be successful in offering an account of the origin 
of the apparently intuitive asymmetrical attitude, they are much less 
successful in showing whether and in what way that attitude can be 
justified, especially in the case of past and future non-existence.47
  Parfit puts this problem like this: 
Whether a pain is in the past or future is a mere difference in its 
relation to the present moment. And if it is not irrational to care more 
about pains that are in the future, why is it irrational to care more 
about pains that are in the nearer future?48
  One might say that the claim that we do not care more about pains that are in the past 
can be justified by the fact that we cannot affect the past. Whatever we do now, we 
cannot change what has already occurred in the past; whereas our present actions can 
affect what will occur in the future. However, this objection might be used to justify my 
previous point that past and future experiences are different from past and future non-
existence. This objection relies on the claim that we cannot affect our past experience 
whereas what we do now can affect our future experience. Nevertheless, this difference, 
if true, can only be used to justify our different attitudes toward past experience and 
future experience. On the other hand, our present actions can neither affect our past non-
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existence nor affect our future non-existence. Whatever we do now, we will become 
nothing after death. So if anyone thinks that we have different attitudes toward past non-
existence and future non-existence, he has to find another way to justify this difference. 
One might say, even if some future suffering is inevitable, even if it cannot be affected 
by our present actions, we can still fear it in a different way than the fear of the past. 
Parfit provides a prisoner case to illustrate this opinion: 
Suppose we are in prison, and will be tortured later today. In such 
cases, when we believe that our future suffering is inevitable, our 
attitude towards it does not fall into line with our attitude towards 
past suffering…we are concerned about these future pains simply 
because they are not yet in the past.49
   However, this case can only provide reason for the fear of future pain or suffering. 
When it comes to the death issue, it can only justify that it is rational to fear the pain 
during the process of dying. But again, if we accept that death leads to annihilation, the 
fear of future non-existence still requires further justification.  
Chapter 6 Conclusion  
  It is clear now that Lucretius intends to remove the fear of death by proposing the 
symmetry argument, and his effort is quite successful. The symmetry argument has 
withstood the test of its criticisms. Closer examination of those criticisms only 
strengthens the creativity and coherence of the symmetry argument. According to the 
analysis above, both the deprivation approach and the psychology approach fail to defeat 
Lucretius’ argument. It seems that both the objection that tries to break the symmetry 
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between past non-existence and future non-existence and the objection that tries to break 
the symmetry between our attitude toward the past non-existence and our attitude toward 
the future non-existence do not work.  
 However, this doesn’t mean the symmetry argument is exempt from any suspicion. 
There is still a little-discussed problem with the symmetry argument. That is, Lucretius 
simply presupposes our psychological preference of our present attitudes toward the past 
non-existence that we do not fear our past non-existence.50 To guarantee the soundness of 
the symmetry argument, Epicureans have to provide further justification for this premise. 
Anyway, Lucretius’ symmetry argument provides a supplemental argument for 
Epicurus’ existence argument by aiming to mitigate the fear of the status of being dead; 
and the symmetry between pre-natal non-existence and post-mortem non-existence is 
quite coherent. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
50 This sort of little discussed difficulty is called ‘the backfire problem’ by Rosenbaum. For further details about this 
issue, see “The Symmetry Argument: Lucretius against the fear of death,” pp. 368-369.  
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